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Courts Flailing in the Waters of the Louisiana Conflicts Code:
Not Waving but Drowning

Russell . Weintraub*

I. INTRODUCTION: CASES STUDIED

I analyzed the decisions of Louisiana state courts and of federal courts that, as
of December 1, 1999, have applied Articles 3537 and 3540 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, which govern choice of law for "conventional obligations."' Of the thirtytwo cases in this group,2 fifteen misapply the articles in the most fundamental
Copyright 2000, by Russell J.Weintraub.
Professor ofLaw and holder of Powell Chair, University of Texas School of Law. The title
is from Stevie Smith, Not Waving But Drowning,in Selected Poems 18 (1964):
I was much too far out all my life. And not waving but drowning.
1. La. Civ. Code art. 3537 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an issue ofconventional obligations is governed
by the law ofthe state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence ofthe relevant policies
of the involved states in the light of: (1) the pertinent contacts of each state to the parties
and the transaction, including the place of negotiation, formation, and performance ofthe
contract, the location of the object of the contract, and the place of domicile, habitual
residence, or business ofthe parties; (2) the nature, type, and purpose of the contract; and
(3) the policies referred to in Article 3515, as well as the policies of facilitating the orderly
planning oftransactions, ofpromoting multistate commercial intercourse, and ofprotecting
one party from undue imposition by the other.
La. Civ. Code art. 3540 provides:
All other issues of conventional obligations are governed by the law expressly chosen or
clearly relied upon by the parties, except to the extent that law contravenes the public policy
of the state whose law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 3515 which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Book, an issue in a case having contacts with other
states is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired
if its law were not applied to that issue.
That state is determined by evaluating the strength and pertinence of the relevant policies
of all involved states in the light of: (I) the relationship of each state to the parties and the
dispute; and (2) the policies and needs ofthe interstate and international systems, including
the policies of upholding the justified expectations of parties and ofminimizing the adverse
consequences that might follow from subjecting a party to the law of more than one state.
2. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999); Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 145 F.3d 305
(5th Cir. 1998); Roberts v. Energy Dev. Corp., 104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1997); Cherokee Pump & Equip.
Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Bank of Louisiana/Kenwin Shops Inc., No. 97
MDL 1193, 1999 WL 1072542 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1999); Copelco Capital, Inc. v. Gautreaux, No. 99*

850,1999 WL 1034740 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1999); Pettigrew v.ABB Lummus Global, Inc., 53 F. Supp.
2d 864 (E.D. La. 1999); Bauer v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. La. 1999); Metal
Bldg. Components, Inc. v. Gibson Roofers, Inc., No. 97-2185, 1999 WL 225453 (E.D. La. Apr. 15,
1999); Muirfield, L.P. v. Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600 (W.D. La. 1998); CXY Chems. U.S.A. v.
Gerling Global Gen. Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. La. 1998); N.J. Collins, Inc. v. Pacific Leasing,
Inc., No. 97-2379, 1997 WL 786239 (E.D. La. Dec. 19,1997); R-Square Invs., Inc. v. Teledyne Indus.,
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manner. The courts in these cases never identify a difference between Louisiana
law and the law of another state before making a choice-of-law analysis.' In three
more cases, the courts apply the Code provisions even though the differences
between Louisiana law and the law ofthe other state would not produce a difference
in result." Other cases make some other fundamental mistake in the mechanical
process of applying the Code provisions.' Only five,6 or perhaps six cases" apply
the Code as the drafters intended. It is for these few cases that criticism reaches the
level of evaluating the courts' sagacity in applying the Code to the circumstances.
I wish to make it clear at the outset that I am not disparaging the wisdom or
competence of any judge. Judges are not stupid, just busy. They meet choice-oflaw issues rarely. Of the twenty-nine judges on the Louisiana courts ofappeal who
participated in these decisions, only four had more than one choice-of-law case, and
each of those had only two cases.' Of the twenty-one federal Fifth Circuit and
district court judges who participated inthese decisions, six had more than one case,
and only one of these had more than two cases.' Perhaps in no other area ofthe law

No. 96-2978, 1997 WL 436245 (E.D. La. July 31, 1997); Coast Concrete Seres., Inc. v. Cooper Equip.
Co., No. 95-3949,1996 WL 577937 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1996); Anderson v. T &D Mach. Handling, Inc.,
Nos. 94-3188, 94-3194, 94-3568, 95-0066, 94-1062, 95-4262, 1996 WL 518140 (E.D. La. Sept. 9,
1996); Abell Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., No. 96-0717,1996 WL 481072 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 1996);
Ludwig v. Bottomly & Assocs., Inc., No. 95-3830, 1996 WL 426678 (E.D. La. July 26, 1996);
Russellville Steel Co. v.Bohnert Constr. Co.,No. 94-3332,1995 WL5 10081 (E.D. La. Aug. 25,1995);
Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 93-0587, 1994 WL 449539 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 1994); Thomas v. Amoco Oil
Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993); First Ala. Bank v. Baber, No. 92-1662, 1992 WL245611 (E.D.
La. Sept. 16, 1992); Coleman v. Robinson, No. 99-3097, 1999 WL 691887 (La. App. 4th Cir. Sept. 1,
1999); Anderson v. Oliver, 705 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 718 So. 2d 434 (La. 1998);
Plyman v. Strain, 702 So. 2d 1204 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Shell Oil Co. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc.,
701 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Trautman v. Poor, 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996);
Welch v. A.G. Edwards &Sons, Inc., 677 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Moore v. KLLM, Inc.,
673 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996); Gill v. Matlack, Inc., 671 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1995); Sentilles Optical Seres. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995); Holcomb v.
Universal Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994); Levy v. Jackson, 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1993).
Ilocated the cases by running through Westlaw various combinations of key words from Articles
3537 and 3540, sometimes including the numbers of the articles.
3. See infra notes 10-23"and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
5. . See infra notes 15-19, 45-67 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
8. H.Charles Gaudin: Shell Oil Co. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 701 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1997); Moore v. KLLM, Inc., 673 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996). Sol Gothard: same cases
as Gaudin, supra. Glenn B. Gremillion: Anderson v. Oliver, 705 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 718 So. 2d 434 (La. 1998); Trautman v.Poor, 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996). Charles
R. Jones: Welch v. A.G. Edwards &Sons, Inc., 677 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996); Levy v.
Jackson, 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
9. Stanwood R. Duval, Jr.: Inre Bank of Louisiana/Kenwin Shops Inc., No. 97 MDL 1193,
1999 WL 1072542 (E.D. La. Nov. 24. 1999); Anderson v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., Nos. 94-3188,
94-3194, 94-3568, 95-0066, 94-1062, 95-4262, 1996 WL 518140 (E.D. La. Sept. 1996). Edith H.
Jones: Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999); Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 145 F.3d 305
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are judges as dependent on the parties' lawyers to provide guidance. The only time
that it is fair to blame ajudge for a botched choice-of-law decision is when counsel
has held up the light and the judge persists in not seeing. Without studying the
briefs and transcripts ofarguments in all ofthese cases, I cannot know whether this
has occurred, but it is counter-intuitive to think that such obduracy in error occurs
frequently, if at all.
Part II of this article analyzes the cases. Part III draws some conclusions and
suggests actions that might result in better choice-of-law decisions.
II. ANALYSIS

OF THE CASES

A. Cases that Do Not Indicateany Differences Between the Laws
. As stated in Part I, fifteen of the cases make the basic mistake ofpurporting to
apply the Code without adverting to any differences between Louisiana law and the
law of another state. 0 The reason that this is a basic mistake is that the Code selects
law separately for each issue in the case and requires a court to apply "the law of
the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not
applied to that issue."'" In order to determine which state's policy "would be most
seriously impaired," a court must first identify the substantive rule applicable to the
issue in Louisiana and in the other state or states that have contacts with the parties
and the transaction. If, and only if, there are different applicable rules, should the
court proceed to identify the policies underlying the conflicting rules and then
(5th Cir. 1998). Mary Ann Vial Lemmon: Bauer v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d
514 (E.D. La 1999); CXY Chems. U.S.A. v. Gerling Global Gen. Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. La.
1998). G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.: Copelco Capital, Inc. v. Gautreaux, No. 99-850, 1999 WL 1034740
(E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1999); Coast Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Equip. Co., No. 95-3949, 1996 WL
577937 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1996). Nauman S. Scott: Muirfield, L.P. v. Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600
(W.D. La. 1998); Thomas v. Amoco Oil Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993). Morey L. Sear (four
cases): Abell Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., No. 96-0717, 1996 WL 481072 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 1996);
Ludwig v. Bottomly & Assocs., Inc., No. 95-3830, 1996 WL 426678 (E.D. La. July 26, 1996);
Russellville Steel Co. v. Bohnert Constr. Co., No 94-3332, 1995 WL 510081 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 1995);
First Ala. Bank v. Baber, No. 96-1662, 1992 WL 245611 (E.D. La. Sept 16, 1992).
10. In re Bank of Louisiana/Kenwin Shops Inc., No. 97 MDL 1193,1999 WL 1072542 (E.D. La.
Nov. 24, 1999); Pettigrew v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. La. 1999); Metal
Bldg. Components, Inc. v. Gibson Roofers, Inc., No. 97-2185, 1999 WL 225453 (E.D. La. Apr. 15,
1999); Muirfield, L.P. v. Pitts, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 600 (W.D. La. 1998); CXY Chems. U.S.A. v.
Gerling Global Gen. Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. La. 1998); Coast Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Cooper
Equip. Co., No. 95-3949, 1996 WL 577937 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1996); Anderson v. T & D Mach.
Handling, Inc., Nos. 94-3188,94-3194,94-3568, 95-0066,94-1062,95-4262, 1996 WL 518140 (E.D.
La. Sept. 9, 1996); Abell Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., No. 96-0717, 1996 WL 481072 (E.D. La. Aug.
23,1996); Russellville Steel Co. v. Bohnert Constr. Co., No. 94-3332,1995 WL510081 (E.D. La. Aug.
25, 1995); Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., No. 93-0587, 1994 WL 449539 (E.D. La. Aug 16,1994); Thomas
v. Amoco Oil Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993); First Ala. Bank v. Baber, No. 92-1662, 1992 WL
245611 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 1992); Coleman v. Robinson, No. 99-3097,1999WL 691887 (La. App. 4th
Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); Plyman v. Strain, 702 So. 2d 1204 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Gill v. Matlack, Inc.,
671 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).'
11. La. Civ. Code arts. 3515, 3537, supra note 1.
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determine which policy would be most seriously impaired if not given effect.
Moreover, two years after the Code took effect, Professor Symeonides, who was the
Reporter for the Conflicts Codification, wrote an article explaining the new law.12
In this article, he commented on two of the cases discussed here13 and criticized
them for not determining whether there was any difference between the laws of
Louisiana and the other states involved. He remarked, "[w]ithout [reference to the
relevant policies of the two states] the choice-of-law decision is bound to
degenerate into a quantitative counting of contacts.""'
It may well be that in one or more of these fifteen cases the author of the
opinion was aware of a difference in law that he or she did not mention. For
example, one ofthe cases in the sample, Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 5 emerged again
in the Fifth Circuit in an opinion that indicates why a choice between Ontario and
Louisiana law might be necessary. 6 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit opinion twice
correctly stated that if there is no difference in law, the Code requires the court to
apply the law of the Louisiana forum.'7 The Fifth Circuit opinion decided that a
clause choosing Ontario law did not cover the issue before the court and that
therefore Article 3540 did not require application ofthat law.'" The opinion should
have gone on to explain why, in the absence of an effective choice of law, Article
3537 required the court to apply Louisiana law. The opinion, however, simply
assumes that if Ontario law does not apply under the choice-of-law clause, the court
can eliminate Ontario law from its analysis. 9
Could the drafters, by more clearly stating the central importance of
determining whether it makes any difference which law applies, have prevented
these fifteen courts from misapplying the Code? Products in everyday use have
conspicuous warnings to guard against misuse. I have a four-legged aluminum
ladder that has three such warnings. The ladder has a thin plastic shelf near the top
for holding tools, pails, and such. Bold letters on this shelf read "NOT A STEP."
Three steps from the top ofthis twelve-foot ladder there is a sign reading "DO NOT
CLIMB ABOVE THIS STEP." Elsewhere there is a sign stating: "WARNING.
MISUSE OF THIS LADDER CAN RESULT IN INJURY OR DEATH." Perhaps
the drafters should have done the same for Article 3537. "WARNING. MISUSE
OF THIS SECTION WILL PRODUCE NONSENSE. UNTIL YOU KNOW THAT
THE LAW OF SOME OTHER STATE DIFFERS FROM LOUISIANA LAW IN
A WAY THAT WILL AFFECT THE RESULT, USE LOUISIANA LAW."
12. Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana Conflict Law: Two Surprises, 54 La. L. Rev. 497 n.*
(1994).
13. Id.at 524-27 (discussing FirstAla. Bank v. Baber, No. 92-1662, 1992 WL 245611 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 1992) and Thomas v. Amoco Oil Co., 815 F. Supp. 184 (W.D. La. 1993)).

14. Symeonides, supra note 12, at 525.
15. No. 93-0587, 1994 WL449539 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 1994).
16. Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 145 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that Ontario, unlike
Louisiana, might not permit the plaintiff to sue as athird party beneficiary ofan agreement transferring
the property from plaintiff's assignee to asuccessor).
17. ld.at309n.14.
18. Id. at 309.
19. Id. at 310.
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Does not comment (d) to Article 3537 clearly convey this message?
[T]he first step of the process is to identify "the relevant policies of the
involved states."... The "relevant policies" of that state are identified
through the resources of the interpretative process by focusing on the
specific rules of substantive contract law whose applicability is being
urged in the particular case.20
Not clear enough apparently. One of the fifteen cases, CXY Chemicals US.A. v.
2
GerlingGlobalGeneralInsuranceCo.2 quotes comment (d), but never indicates
whether Alberta and Louisiana laws differ with regard to construing the insurance
cause
policy in issue. Instead, the court discusses the abstract policies that might
23
loss.
a
covering
not
or
covering
as
policy
insurance
an
a state to construe
24
I have not included CherokeePump& EquipmentInc. v. AuroraPump in the
fifteen cases, although it selects Illinois law without first determining whether that
law is different from Louisiana law. In Cherokee Pump, a Louisiana distributor
sued an Illinois manufacturer for wrongful termination of the distribution contract.
2
The contract chose Illinois law, under which the termination was proper. The
reason that this case is not included as improperly choosing law when a choice is
not necessary, is that by choosing Illinois law, the court avoided the difficult issue
of whether the termination was improper under a recently enacted Louisiana statute
26
and, if so, whether the court could constitutionally apply the statute retroactively.
It is legitimate adjudicative strategy to decide a case on an easy issue in order to
avoid a difficult issue, especially one of constitutional dimensions.
The problem with this strategy in Cherokee Pump is that the choice-of-law
issue was far more difficult than the court seemed to think. The opinion dismissed
the dealer's contention that Illinois law "contravenes the public policy"" of
Louisiana by abrogating the termination requirements of the Louisiana's
Repurchase Statute:
We conclude that [the distributor] has not met that burden. It has adduced
no authority to establish that the amendment to the Repurchase Statute
expresses a public policy of Louisiana that would displace the choice-oflaw determination made by the parties.28
Perhaps this dismissal of the public policy argument is justified in view of the
Louisiana distributor's burden ofpersuasion. Nevertheless, a choice-of-law clause
imposed by a franchiser or manufacturer should not deprive a state's franchisees

20.
21.
22.
23.

La. Civ. Code art. 3537, cmt (d).
991 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. La. 1998).
Id. at 774.
Id. at 776-77.

24. 38 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1994).
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 247-48, 249-50.
Id. at 249-50.
La. Civ. Code art. 3540, supra note 1.
Cherokee, 38 F.3d at 252.
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and distributors of protection under statutes specifically designed to ameliorate
contracts of adhesion. In some states, the franchise statute specifically invalidates
choice-of-law clauses which deprive local franchisees of the statute's protection. 9
Even without an express provision invalidating choice-of-law clauses, courts have
refused to apply such clauses if they choose law that gives less protection than the
franchisee's home-state statute.30
CherokeePump suggests another question. Does what I have said above, that
a court should determine whether the law of another state is different from
Louisiana law, apply to Article 3540, which gives the parties power to choose law?
Suppose, for example, the contract chooses Missouri law and neither party
demonstrates that Missouri law "contravenes the public policy of the state whose
law would otherwise be applicable under Article 3537. '"3 Should the court, with
the assistance of the parties, simply determine Missouri law and apply it? Perhaps
so if the court can easily determine and apply Missouri law. On the other hand, it
might be more efficient to assume that Missouri law would produce the same result
as Louisiana law and apply Louisiana law until one of the parties rebuts this
presumption. Otherwise a court might discourse learnedly on the law of another
state, complete with citations to many decisions of the courts of that state, when
there is not a dime's worth of difference between that law and Louisiana law. For
example, RussellvilleSteel Co. v. BohnertConstructionCo. a2applied Missouri law
as the law chosen by the parties, cited Missouri cases, and concluded that "[u]nder
Missouri law, a party claiming breach of contract must prove (1) performance by
the party seeking to enforce the agreement; (2) non-performance by the other party;
and (3) damages." 33 Isn't that amazing!
B. Cases in which Different Laws Producethe Same Result
Nor should a Louisiana court displace Louisiana law with the law of another
state if that state's law, although different from Louisiana law, produces the same
result. It is more efficient for the court to say, "it does not make any difference
whether X law or Louisiana law applies, the result is _
." In Copelco Capital,
34
Inc. v. Gautreaux,
pursuant to a choice-of-law clause in a lease of medical
equipment, the court applied New Jersey statutory requirements for disclaimer of
warranties and concluded that a disclaimer was effective.35 Then the court
29. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4917(b) (1993); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-624(b) (1994);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 80C.21 (West 1999).
30. See Flynn Beverage Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill.
1993) (construing anti-waiver provision of Illinois Franchise Act); Cusamano v. Norrell Health Care,
Inc., 607 N.E.2d 246 (111.
App. 1992); cf Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Melody, 869 F. Supp.
1180,1185 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (enforcing choice-of-law clause because law chosen is "virtually identical"
with law of franchisee's state).
31. La. Civ. Code. art. 3540, supra note 1.
32. No. 94-3332, 1995 WL 510081 (E.D. La. Aug. 25, 1995).
33. Id. at *2.
34. No. 99-850, 1999 WL 1034740 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1999).
35. Id. at *3-*4.
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determined that applying New Jersey law is not contrary to Louisiana public policy
because "the waiver is valid under the more stringent Louisiana law, as well as
under New Jersey law."3 It would have saved time and effort to simply find "even
ifDr. Gautreaux is correct that Louisiana law applies, the disclaimer is effective, so
there is no need to explore the intricacies of the New Jersey Commercial
Transactions Code."
Two other cases in the sample also spin their wheels exploring the laws ofother
states pursuant to choice-of-law clauses when those laws do not affect the result.
Welch v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc." determined that under Missouri law a
broker's agreement to indemnify his employer for certain losses was valid.3" The
issue before the court, however, was whether it should overturn for "manifest
disregard of the law" an arbitration award in the employer's favor.39 Even if
Louisiana law applied and the award was improper under that law, the court stated
that "errors of fact or law do not invalidate a fair and honest arbitration award."4
Moreover, the award may have been correct under Louisiana law if the employee
was not "acting in the course and scope ofhis employment at the time the incidents
forming the basis for indemnity occurred. .. ."4' The case fills eight pages of the
reporter when, after stating the facts, the court should have delivered a one-sentence
opinion: No matter what law applies the employee has not come close to meeting
his burden of demonstrating any of the bases that would justify overturning an
arbitration award: "dishonesty, bias, or any conscious attempt to disregard [the
applicable] law." 2
Sentilles Optical Services v. Phillips43 refused to enforce an employee's
covenant not to compete with his former employer. The employment contract
selected North Carolina law. Sentilles devotes two and a halfpages to discussing
the operation ofArticles 3537 and 3540 and applying them to the circumstances of
the case before delivering a final sentence that rendered everything that preceded
it an exercise in superfluous erudition: "While we consider the covenant
unenforceable under either [North Carolina or Louisiana] law, we shall
mechanically apply the Louisiana statutory requirement and affirm the judgment
holding the covenant unenforceable." '
C. Cases thatFailto Apply a SpecialStatutory Choice-of-Law Rule
Articles 3515, 3537, 3540 and the rest of the 1992 Louisiana Conflict Code
(Book IV) do not apply if some other statute provides a choice-of-law rule for the

36. Id. at 04.
37. 677 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
38. Id. at 524.
39.

Id.

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 526.
Id. at 524 (stating the standard for overturning an arbitration award).
651 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 400.
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specific matter in issue. This is made clear by Article 14: "Unless otherwise
expressly provided by the law of this state, cases having contacts with other states
are governed by the law selected in accordance with the provisions ofBook IV of
this Code." 5 Revision comment (a) to Article 3537 repeats this message:
According to Article 14, this and any other Article of this Title apply
"[u]nless otherwise expressly provided by the law of this state." The
following are among the Revised Statutes that "provide otherwise" [citing
the Uniform Commercial Code, the Insurance Code, the Lease of
Movables Act, and statutes applicable to consumer transactions]. When
applicable, these statutes will prevail, being more specific, over the
provisions of this Section.4'
What could be clearer? Nevertheless four cases in the sample apply Articles 3537
and 3540 even when the court is aware of a more specific statutory rule.47
Two of the cases, Anderson v. Oliver s and Holcomb v. UniversalInsurance
Co.,4' refused to apply the following choice-of-law provision in the Insurance Code:
This Subparagraph and its requirement for uninsured motorist coverage
shall apply to any liability insurance covering any accident which occurs
in this state and involves a resident ofthis state.50
In Anderson, a Georgia insured was injured by a collision in Louisiana with a
vehicle driven by a Louisiana resident. The issue was the amount of the Georgia
resident's underinsured motorist coverage: $1,000,000 if Louisiana law applied,
$40,000 if Georgia law applied. The court applied Georgia law to protect the
reasonable expectations of insurer and insured and because "[t]here is no
compelling Louisiana interest that would override the application of Georgia law
to its contracts in this case."'" In Holcomb, a collision in Louisiana with a
Louisiana resident injured Arkansas residents. The issue was whether the Arkansas
residents had waived underinsured motorist coverage: yes if Arkansas law applied;
no if Louisiana law applied. The court applied Arkansas law because that result
advanced Arkansas' legitimate interests in regulating insurance issued in its state
to Arkansas residents and impinged on no Louisiana interest.52
Both cases would have reached the right result if it were not for the provision
ofthe Louisiana Insurance Code mandating application ofLouisiana law. 53 It may
45. La. Civ. Code art. 14, supra note 1.
46. La. Civ. Code art. 3537, revision cmt. (a).
47. Coast Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Equip. Co., No. 95-3949, 1996 WL 577937 (E.D. La.
Oct. 8, 1996); Anderson v. Oliver, 705 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 718 So. 2d 434 (La.
1998); Moore v. KLLM, Inc., 673 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996); Holcomb v. Universal Ins. Co.,
640 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
48. 705 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 718 So. 2d 434 (La. 1998).
49. 640 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
50. La. R.S. 22:1406(DXiii) (1995).
51. Anderson, 705 So. 2d at 306.

52. Holcomb,640 So. 2d at 722.
53.

See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
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be that the Insurance Code is wrong in this regard, that it officiously meddles in
what is the concern of sister states. Nevertheless, the legislature has spoken and
unless its choice-of-law mandate is so outrageous as to be unconstitutional,
Louisiana courts must obey. It is exceedingly unlikely that the statute is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ofthe United States has left the states free to
do what they will with choice of law, so long as they do not do it in the street and
scare the horses. 4
Moore v. KLLM, Inc." held that the Louisiana Office of Workers'
Compensation had subject matter jurisdiction of a claim for benefits filed by a
Louisiana employee hired in Louisiana by a trucking company headquartered in
Mississippi. The worker was injured on the job in California. The employment
contract provided that Mississippi Workers' Compensation law "shall be the
exclusive remedy against the employer on account of injury... arising out of
employment."' First, the opinion spends a page and a half quoting Articles 3515,
3537 and 3540. Then, for good measure, the court throws in Articles 3542 and
3544 covering choice of law for torts.57 As an afterthought, the court quotes
portions ofthe Louisiana Workers' Compensation law" that provide coverage for
any worker "working under a contract ofhire made in this state" 9 and declare that
"[n]o contract ...
shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from
any liability created by this Chapter ....,0 These provisions of the Workers'

Compensation law are special statutory choice-of-law rules that controlled the case
and are all that the court should have cited in a one paragraph rather than a four
page opinion.
Coast Concrete Services, Inc. v. Cooper Equipment Co. 61 concerned a
lease between a North Carolina lessor and a Louisiana lessee. The court
quoted Article 3540 and decided that applying the law of North Carolina, as
stipulated in the lease, did not violate Louisiana public policy.62 The reason
the court gives for this conclusion is that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3303,
governing leases ofmovables, expressly authorizes the parties to choose the law of
the state of the lessor's principal office.63 Section 9:3303 is a specific statutory
choice-of-law provision and renders Article 3540 inapplicable. Moreover, the court
does not indicate why it makes a difference whether it applies North Carolina or
Louisiana law.
54.

See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633 (1981) (permitting a Minnesota

court to determine the level ofuninsured motorist insurance under Minnesota law although the insurer
issued the policy in Wisconsin to a Wisconsin resident who was killed in Wisconsin).
55. 673 So. 2d 1268 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1996).
56. Id. at 1269.
57. La. Civ. Code arts. 3542 ("General Rule"), 3544 ("Issues of Loss distribution and financial
protection").
58. Moore, 673 So. 2d at 1272.

59.

La. R.S. 23:1035.1(1)(b) (1998).

60.
61.

La. R.S. 23:1033 (1998).
No. 95-3949, 1996 WL 577937 (E.D. La. Oct. 8, 1996).

62.

Id. at *2-*3.

63.

Id. at *3 (quoting La. R.S. 9:3303(B) (1997)).
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Apparently Article 14 4and comment (a) to Article 353765 are not sufficient to
deter courts from applying the general conflicts provisions of the Civil Code when
more specific choice-of-law provisions in other Louisiana statutes control the
outcome. Perhaps another warning sign shouldprecede Articles 3515 through 3549
in the conflicts code: "STOP. READ THE FOLLOWING STATUTORY
PROVISIONS: [here insert every special choice-of-law provision in any Louisiana
statute and keep the list up to date]. IF ANY OF THEM APPLY, USE THAT
STATUTE TO CHOOSE LAW. DO NOT USE THIS ARTICLE." Silly? Maybe,
but no sillier than the warning signs on my ladder.66 Ifthere had been this warning,
the court in Holcomb could not have said:
Finally, we conclude that [the specific choice-of-law provision in the
Louisiana Insurance Code] is inapplicable under the circumstances. This
is so because we conclude, under our conflicts of law provisions, that
Arkansas law should govern the outcome of this proceeding. The sub-part
of the cited [insurance] statute referred to above is Louisiana law and
therefore inapplicable.67
D. Cases that GotIt Right
Five of the cases in the sample mastered the mechanics of applying the Conflict
of Laws Code.6" Each of these cases identified the differences between the
putatively applicable laws as the first step in the court's analysis. Bauer v.
Government Employees Ins. Co.69 and Trautman v. Poor7" properly applied the
Insurance Code choice-of-law provision for coverage of injuries caused by
uninsured and underinsured motorists.7 Bauer correctly noted that the Insurance
Code provision does not control because the accident in Louisiana "did not involve
a Louisiana resident."72 The court then applied Article 3537 to deny coverage
under the law of Mississippi, where the insured lived and where the policy was
issued.73 Trautman correctly noted that the Insurance Code provision controlled
and applied Louisiana law to confer coverage despite the fact that there was no
coverage under the law ofTennessee, where the insured lived and the policy was
issued.74
64. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
66. See supra text following note 19.
67. Holcomb v. Universal Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 718, 722 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
68. Roberts v. Energy Dev. Corp., 104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1997); Bauer v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 61 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. La. 1999); Ludwig v. Bottomly & Assocs., Inc., No. 953830,1996 WL 426678 (E.D. La. July 26, 1996); Shell Oil Co. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 701 So. 2d
1038 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997); Trautman v. Poor, 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).

69. 61 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. La. 1999).
70. 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
71.
72.
73.
74.

See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
Bauer, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
Id.at516-17.
Trautman, 685 So. 2d at 519-20.
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Roberts v. Energy Development Corp." noted that an indemnity agreement
which chose Texas law was valid under Texas law but not under Louisiana law."6
Then, applying Article 3537, the court remanded the case directing the trial court
to determine whether Louisiana law would apply in the absence of the
choice-of-law clause and, if so, whether applying Texas law would contravene
Louisiana policy."
Ludwig v. Bottomly & Associates, Inc.78 followed the choice-of-law clause in
an employment contract to apply Georgia law, -under which the oral agreement
alleged by the Louisiana employee was invalid.7" The court properly noted that
when applying Article 3740, which permits the parties to choose the applicable law,
the employee, as the party opposing the choice-of-law clause, "bears the burden of
proving that [Georgia law] violates public policy.""0 The court then determined that
the employee had not met this burden.81
Shell Oil Co. v. Hollywood Marine,Inc.82 applied the law ofTexas, where a
liability policy was issued to a Texas company, and denied coverage that would
attach under Louisiana law. The court found that no Louisiana "interest is sufficient
to override the compelling interest Texas has in regulating insurance contracts
written in Texas and issued to Texas companies."83
Perhaps NJ Collins,Inc. v. Pacific Leasing,Inc." should be included in the
list of cases that got it right. The court noted that Guam, where the seller of two
tugboats was headquartered, had enacted Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), while Louisiana, where the buyer was incorporated, had not. 5 The
court then chose the law of Guam, based on the physical contacts with that island
and to protect the seller's "justifiable expectation that Article 2 of the U.C.C. would
govern the agreements at issue ... ." 86 The opinion also stated that "the parties
agree that Guam is the jurisdiction whose policies would be most seriously impaired
if its laws were not applied." 87 The opinion, however, never indicated why the
result might be different under Louisiana law. The court denied a motion for
summary judgment because "issues of material fact exist" concerning the buyer's
contention that the seller waived the buyer's failure to make payments required by
the contract of sale.88 It is likely that issues of fact would have prevented granting
the motion no matter what law applied. Nevertheless, it is difficult to fault the court
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 783-84.
Id. at 786-87.
No. 95-3830, 1996 WL 426678 (E.D. La. July 26, 1996).
Id. at *2-*4.
Id. at *2.
Id.701 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1041.
No. 97-2379, 1997 WL 786239 (E.D. La. Dec. 19, 1997).
Id. at *4.

86. Id.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at *5.
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for simply analyzing the issues under the U.C.C., rather than comparing U.C.C. and
Louisiana treatments of the waiver issue.
Three of the cases, Woodfield v. Bowman, 9 R-Square Investments, Inc. v.
Teledyne Industries," and Levy v. Jackson,9 might receive honorable mention.
They start off on the right foot by specifying what difference it makes what law
applies, but then trip on some aspect of applying the provisions of the Conflict of
Laws Code. Woodfieldfollowed Holcomb v. UniversalInsuranceCo., which did
not apply the special Insurance Code provision on choice of law,93 when Woodfield
should have followed Trautman v. Poor,"'which did.95 R-Square Investments did
a fine job of applying Article 3537 to determine contractual liability for a defective
product," but did not apply the foreseeability rule of Article 354597 to determine
whether Louisiana law applies to tort liability.9 s Levy v. Jackson" properly decided
that under the common domicile rule of Article 3544,"°° the Alabama guest statute
applied to prevent recovery for ordinary negligence.' ' The court then, however,
declared that "this conflict of law problem is foremost and principally an issue of
insurance coverage, and therefore one of contract" and applied Article 3537."°2
Fortunately it decided that Article 3537 also requires application ofAlabama law. 3

III. CONCLUSION
It is a sad spectacle when members of a learned profession make fundamental
mistakes in the process for applying the Louisiana Conflict of Laws Code. One
might have thought that Professor Symeonides' article explaining the Code'" and
the carefully drafted comments that follow each of its provisions would have
prevented these errors. The conflict of laws is crucial to any lawyer who advises
clients engaged in interstate or international transactions or who assists in resolving
disputes arising from those transactions. When bar examiners took the subject off
the bar examinations, attendance in the course plummeted. Louisiana's experience
89. 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999).
90. No. 96-2978,1997 WL 436245 (E.D. La. July 31, 1997).
91. 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
92. 640 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
93. See supranotes 48-51, 66 and accompanying text.
94. 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996).
95. See supranote 74 and accompanying text.
96.

R-Square Invs., No. 96-2978, 1997 WL 436245, at *3-*5.

97. La. Civ. Code art. 3545 (applying Louisiana law to determine liability for damage caused in
Louisiana by adefective product if "defendant's products of the same type were made available in this
state through ordinary commercial channels").
98. R-Squarelnvs., No. 96-2978,1997 WL 436245, at *6-*7 (stating that Louisianalaw permits
recovery in tort for injury to the product itselfbut applying Article 3537 rather than Article 3545).
99. 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
100. La. Civ. Code art.3544(1 )(goveming"[i]ssues ofloss distribution and financial protection").
101. Levy, 612 So.2d at 896.
102. Id.at 897.
103. Id.
104. See Symeonides, supra note 12.
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with its Conflict ofLaws Code is not unique. All over the country, state and federal
courts that purport to be following one of the new choice-of-law methods list
territorial contacts and select law without knowing whether it matters what law
applies. °' It may help to greatly increase the number ofhours devoted to choice of
law in continuing legal education programs. Today, facility in choice-of-law theory
is likely to give a lawyer a substantial advantage over opposing counsel. Maybe
conveying that message to law students is a way to get them to take the Conflicts
course without putting it back on the bar examination.

105.

See, e.g., Scheererv. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 92 F. 3d 702,708 (Sth Cir. 1996) (purporting

to apply the "most significant relationship" test, but choosing law by counting physical contacts);

Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 953 S.W.2d 733, 735-37 (Tex. 1997) (choosing

Minnesota law b5, countingphysical contacts although Minnesota law isthe same as that in all the other
states involved). See also Hataway v. Mckinley, 830 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that many
courts "have merely counted contacts rather than engaging in an analysis of the interests and policies
listed in the Restatement").

